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The transposition of the AIFMD in the domestic systems of the EU Member States has changed significantly the legal framework of reference for alternative investment fund managers.
In transposing the Directive, however, the UK Legislature and Regulator succeeded in maintaining in the internal regulation some elements that could be able to attract financial players and investors from other jurisdictions.








This article aims to discuss the UK regulation on alternative investment fund managers (AIFMs) and alternative investment funds (AIFs), amended as a result of the transposition of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD​[1]​). The purpose of the article is to evaluate whether the UK succeeded in finding a legislative compromise between its liberal approach and the tendency of the EU Legislature to overregulate, in order to maintain the attractiveness of its internal system for investors and financial operators, both domestic and foreign, also after the transposition of the Directive​[2]​.
Firstly, it is necessary to review the main regulatory innovations introduced by the AIFMD. Then, the UK legislation on AIFMs and on AIFs, which was amended as result of the introduction of the AIFMD​[3]​. 
	Assessing these changes is particularly significant because the UK is one of the most important jurisdictions in the world for the activities of managing and marketing AIFs​[4]​, in part due to its innovative and business-friendly domestic regulation, which has been amended in order to transpose the EU AIFMD.  
	In this context, it is also worth noting that it is unlikely that the UK Parliament and/or regulator will radically modify the legal framework in this area immediately after the formal exit from the European Union.  

2. The adoption of the AIFMD

	The AIFMD is extremely important because it regulates, at Union level, the activities of management and marketing of alternative investment funds to professional investors. Before the adoption of the AIFMD, these activities and the firms performing them were unregulated, or regulated only at national level​[5]​. This means that it introduced a new regulation regarding a part of the financial sector that earlier was either unregulated or regulated (lightly or fully) only at national level​[6]​.
This new piece of EU legislation is particularly significant in the UK, given that it is the main European financial system for the management and marketing of such investment funds​[7]​. 

2.1. The political reasons of the Directive

It is interesting to analyse firstly the political reasons that have prompted the EU Parliament and Council to adopt a directive specifically addressed to the managers of alternative investment funds. 
The financial crisis had increased the general conviction that it was necessary to rethink the regulatory framework of the financial markets and its financial players. This included the percieved necessity to regulate and oversee the so-called “shadow banking system”​[8]​, which includes many different non-bank financial institutions not strictly regulated and supervised, such as, money market funds, structured investment vehicles, private equity funds​[9]​ and also hedge funds​[10]​. Those, in favour of this new regulation, justified their position by arguing that the financial crisis had highlighted that risks can move easily and quickly from one financial sector to another, and then spread throughout the global system, and this was made it easier by the activity of managers of alternative funds. This was the position of the President of the European Commision, who in 2010 said that “the adoption of the directive means that hedge funds and private equity will no longer operate in a regulatory void outside the scope of supervisors. The new regime brings transparency and security to the way these funds are managed and operate, which adds to the overall stability of our financial system.”​[11]​.
In other words, it was agreed that the financial crisis was not caused by the managers of alternative investment funds​[12]​, but there remained concern about their capability to spread the risks accross the system​[13]​, and this concern was amplified by the magnitude of the phenomenon​[14]​.  
This political view was also supported by the most important countries of continental Europe, including Germany, France and Italy. The UK, in accordance with its more liberal and business-friendly legislative approach, did not support the idea of the need for subjecting these financial players to more regulation and supervision, mainly because their activities usually do not involve retail investors without financial skills​[15]​. The UK Government, in particular, feared that the new regulation could lead many managers away from the EU to other less regulated jurisdictions​[16]​.
Despite the opposition of the UK Government, the Directive was adopted by the European Parliament and the Council on 8 June 2011​[17]​. 

2.2. The aim of the Directive

The aim of the AIFMD was to implement and harmonise at EU level the regulatory framework for the management and marketing of AIFs and the national and cross border supervision of their managers. In other terms, because of their aforementioned capability of spreading the risks accross the system​[18]​, the Directive has been adopted with the purpose of establishing common requirements governing the authorisation and supervision of the AIFMs​[19]​. 
Additionally, the idea of increasing the cross border supervision of the AIFMs was also motivated by the new transnational operation perspectives given by the Directive. As it will be explained in the following paragraphs, in fact, the Directive introduced the Passport regime allowing the AIFMs to carry out freely their activities also in other Member States. 
Therefore, although the EU Legislature officially did not considered the management companies of AIFs as the cause of the financial crisis, moving from the observation of the relevance of the assets managed by them​[20]​ and of their potential capability to disseminate and amplify risks in the entire financial system​[21]​, it decided to intervene in order to regulate the sector and to supervise the AIFMs and their activities.
The result is a harmonised and stringent regulatory and supervisory framework for these activities within the Union​[22]​, but also a continental integrated market of alternative investment funds.

2.3. The subject matter of the Directive and its legislative approach

The Directive focuses on the activities of managing AIFs and marketing units or shares of AIFs to professional investors​[23]​ within the EU territory. This means that these activities and the firms who perform them are now regulated at EU level. 
The Directive starts by defining these activities and the firms, and creating the new legal categories of AIFMs and AIFs.
According to the AIFMD, “managing AIFs” means performing at least portfolio management or risk management for one or more AIFs​[24]​, whilst, marketing units or shares of AIFs means “a direct or indirect offering or placement at the initiative of the AIFM or on behalf of the AIFM of units or shares of an AIF it manages to or with investors domiciled or with a registered office in the Union”​[25]​. 
AIFMs are defined as “legal persons whose regular business is managing one or more AIFs”​[26]​, and AIFs are described as “collective investment undertakings, including investment compartments thereof, which: (i) raise capital from a number of investors, with a view to investing it in accordance with a defined investment policy for the benefit of those investors; and (ii) do not require authorization pursuant to Article 5 of Directive 2009/65/EC”​[27]​. Recital (6) of the AIFMD adds that “the scope of this Directive should be limited to entities managing AIFs as a regular business – regardless of whether the AIF is of an open-ended​[28]​ or a closed-ended​[29]​ type, whatever the legal form of the AIF, and whether or not the AIF is listed – which raise capital from a number of investors with a view to investing that capital for the benefit of those investors in accordance with a defined investment policy”, and Recital (20) specifies that “depending on their legal form, it should be possible for AIFs to be either externally or internally managed”.​[30]​ 
The broad scope of the definition of AIFs highlights the real intention of the EU Legislature for considering every undertaking for collective investment that is not compliant with the UCITS Directive as an AIF​[31]​. This reasonably leads to consider all the investment funds established as undertakings for collective investment not conforming to the UCITS Directive as AIFs and, consequently, their managers as AIFMs. 
It is also relevant to discuss the legislative approach characterizing the Directive itself. A relevant aspect is that it regulates the AIFMs (and their activities) without directly regulating the funds themselves, which, therefore, continue to be subject to the internal rules of each Member State and to be supervised by the national Authorities​[32]​. The legal definition of AIFs is used in order to identify their managers, who, in turn, are subject to the new regulation. The reason why the EU Legislature used this approach can be found in the Recital 10 of the AIFMD, under which it states that “this Directive does not regulate AIFs. AIFs should therefore be able to continue to be regulated and supervised at national level. It would be disproportionate to regulate the structure or composition of the portfolios of AIFs managed by AIFMs at Union level and it would be difficult to provide for such extensive harmonisation due to the very diverse types of AIFs managed by AIFMs. This Directive therefore does not prevent Member States from adopting or from continuing to apply national requirements in respect of AIFs established in their territory”.  
Even if the reasons for this legislative choice are quite simple to understand. It can be argued that the EU Legislature decided to not regulate directly the funds because usually the AIFs are established outside the EU for tax purposes (e.g. only 5% of the global hedge fund sector is domiciled in EU).​[33]​ At the same time, it is necessary to point out that this approach can favour regulatory arbitrage. It is likely, in fact, that AIFMs will choose EU jurisdictions where the regulations of the funds are more lenient and business-friendly in order to establish both themselves and their EU alternative investment funds, given that the burdens and the benefits introduced by the Directive are the same in all the EU Countries​[34]​.

2.4. The scope of the Directive

The scope of the AIFMD is specified in Recital 13, under which “subject to the exceptions and restrictions provided for, this Directive should be applicable to all EU AIFMs​[35]​ managing EU AIFs​[36]​ or non-EU AIFs​[37]​, irrespective of whether or not they are marketed in the Union, to non-EU AIFMs managing EU AIFs, irrespective of whether or not they are marketed in the Union, and to non-EU AIFMs marketing EU AIFs or non-EU AIFs in the Union”​[38]​. In the same way, Article 2 of AIFMD states that “this Directive shall apply to: (a) EU AIFMs which manage one or more AIFs irrespective of whether such AIFs are EU AIFs or non-EU AIFs; (b) non-EU AIFMs which manage one or more EU AIFs; and (c) non-EU AIFMs which market one or more AIFs in the Union irrespective of whether such AIFs are EU AIFs or non-EU AIFs”​[39]​. 
	So, to summarise on the basis of the AIFM’s origin, it is possible to distinguish among the following: (1) EU AIFMs which manage or market one or more AIFs irrespective of whether such AIFs are EU AIFs or non-EU AIFs; (2) non-EU AIFMs which manage one or more EU AIFs; and, (3) non-EU AIFMs which market one or more AIFs in the Union irrespective of whether such AIFs are EU AIFs or non-EU AIFs.
Differently, by distinguishing between the management and marketing perspective, it is possible to list the following different regulated situations:

CLASSIFICATION OF REGULATED AIFMS
Management Perspective	Marketing Perspective
EU AIFMs which manage EU AIFs	EU AIFMs which market units or shares of the EU AIFs that they manage to professional investors in their Member State
EU AIFMs which manage non-EU AIFs	EU AIFMs which market units or shares of the EU AIFs that they manage to professional investors in another Member State than their home Member State
non-EU AIFMs which manage EU AIFs	EU AIFMs which market to professional investors in the EU units or shares of non-EU AIFs which manage with a passport
	EU AIFMs which market (if the Member State allows it) to professional investors units or shares of non-EU AIFs which manage only in the territory of this Member State without a passport
	non-EU AIFMs which market to professional investors in the EU units or shares of EU AIFs with a passport
	non-EU AIFMs which market to professional investors in the EU units or shares of non-EU AIFs with a passport
	non-EU AIFMs which market to professional investors in the EU units or shares of AIFs (both EU and non-EU) without a passport

In view of the above, it can be concluded that the scope of the Directive is very broad and with extraterritorial effects. In fact, it will also apply to non-EU AIFMs​[40]​ that operate in the Union and indirectly to non-EU AIFs managed by EU AIFMs or marketed in the Union by EU AIFMs or non-EU AIFMs. Even non-EU AIFMs interested in managing EU AIFs or in marketing AIFs (both EU and non-EU) in the Union with a passport must be authorised by the Authorities of the Member States. But the benefit that they can obtain by being subjected to the EU regulation is relevant and is represented by the possibility to access directly the whole EU market​[41]​. 
From the marketing perspective, the Directive gives the non-EU AIFMs two different possibilities to access the EU market: (1) with the EU passport; or, (2) through the national private placement regimes​[42]​. In the first case, the non-EU AIFM needs to be authorized by the EU Authorities, whilst in the second one the authorization is granted by the affected Member State​[43]​.
 It also means that the only safe-harbour provided concerns the AIFMs with AIFs under management below some dimensional thresholds, which are outside the scope of the Directive, unless they decide to opt-in in order to get the benefit of the passport​[44]​. In fact, a lighter regime is provided “for AIFMs where the cumulative AIFs under management fall below a threshold of EUR 100 million and for AIFMs that manage only unleveraged AIFs that do not grant investors redemption rights during a period of five years where the cumulative AIFs under management fall below a threshold of EUR 500 million”​[45]​.

2.5. The new rules of the Directive

Accordingly, the EU Member States had to modify their internal regulations on the management and marketing of alternative investment funds on the basis of the AIFM Directive, in particular, introducing rules about the authorization of the managers​[46]​, the obligations of compliance for the companies that manage such funds, the conduct of business​[47]​, the capital requirements, the conflicts of interest, the custody of the funds’ assets entrusted to an independent depositary​[48]​, the valuation procedures of these assets​[49]​ and, above all, the Europen passport regime, that can be considered a kind of “reward” to balance these new expensive regulatory burdens​[50]​. This passport, in fact, gives the managers (and in the future also non-EU managers​[51]​) the opportunity to carry out freely the activities of management and marketing to professional investors of AIFs (and in the future also non-EU funds​[52]​) accross the EU territory​[53]​. 
In sum, this means direct regulation of the managers and indirect regulation of the funds​[54]​.
From a different perspective, it is possible to argue that in order to tackle the above mentioned risks and to create a clear and understandable EU-wide regulatory framework and an efficient supervisory system, the AIFM Directive establishes that the AIFMs, in primis, must be authorized​[55]​ to operate by the supervisory authority of their Member State​[56]​, and, in secundis, provide potential investors with different types of information about: (1) the investment strategies and its objectives; (2) the valuation policies of the assets; (3) the procedures for the redemption of the units or shares; (4) the custody of the assets; (5) the procedures for the risk management; and, (6) the remuneration policies of the management​[57]​.
From the regulatory point of view, the AIFM Directive shows some similarities with the UCITS Directive​[58]​, particularly, with regard to the working structure of the AIFs, given that it is built on the basis of the so called “investment triangle model”, characterising also the Undertakings for the Collective Investment in Transferable Securities, where the three corners are represented by: (1) the investors; (2) the asset manager; and, (3) the depositary-custodian​[59]​, with the fund itself that is in the centre​[60]​. This means that the asset manager decides the investment strategies and the depositary holds the assets on behalf of the fund and in order to grant more protection to the investors. 




It also follows that, at European legislation level, the “investment triangle model” is now the only available model for every undertaking for collective investment addressed both to retail and professional investors.

2.6. The impact of the AIFMD on the EU asset management law

From the EU perspective, now there are two different categories of undertakings for collective investment: (1) UCITSs under the UCITS Directive; and, (2) AIFs under the AIFM Directive.
UCITSs are undertakings for collective investment established in one of the EU Member States conforming to the provisions of the UCITS Directive, which sets forth some significant limits on investments and borrowing in order to protect retail investors, given that these funds have been created to satisfy, particularly, the needs of these investors. They are open-ended retail investment funds regulated in the same way in all the EU Member States. This regulatory harmonisation represents the legal basis on which the so-called European Passport regime is built. The Passport allows the managers of UCITSs to market freely to every kind of investor their funds in all the EU territory. Their working structure is based on the “investment triangle model”.  
AIFs represent the other side of the coin of the EU legislation, given that, due to the large scope of their definition, it is possible to argue that every type of EU undertaking for collective investment not compliant with the UCITS Directive has to be considered and treated as an AIF. This means that they can be open-ended or closed-ended, authorised or not authorised, and established under any legal form. The AIFMD, furthermore, introduced the same Passport regime already in place under the UCITS Directive. Even their working structure is based on the “investment triangle model”. The difference is that the passport under the AIFMD allows the AIFs managers to market within EU territory their funds only to professional investors.
It follows that: (1) every EU undertaking collective investement that is not compliant with the UCITS Directive is considered an AIF; (2) both UCITSs and AIFs can benefit from the so called Europen passport, even though the one given to AIFs only concerns the marketing to professional investors; and, (3) the EU market of undertakings for collective investment seems now almost fully integrated.

3. The UK regulation on alternative investment fund managers and alternative investment funds after the transposition of the AIFMD

	Despite the opposition towards the adoption of the Directive, the UK Legislature transposed in its internal system the AIFMD through the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Regulations 2013​[61]​ (Regulations 2013). The Regulations 2013, in particular, introduced—for the first time—under domestic law the new legal categories of AIFs and AIFMs, created by the Directive, and amended a number of other acts, including the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000) and the Regulated Activities Order 2001 (RAO 2001).
Regulation 3 of the Regulations 2013 gives the same definition of AIF​[62]​ provided by the AIFMD, specifying that “an AIF may be open-ended or closed-ended, and constituted in any legal form, including under a contract, by means of a trust or under statute”​[63]​. 
However, it is interesting to note that regulation 2 adds some new concepts. In particular, it defines the “authorised AIF” as: “a) an authorised unit trust scheme, b) an authorised contractual scheme, or c) an authorised open-ended investment company” as defined in section 237(3) of the FSMA 2000 and the “UK AIF” as an AIF which “a) is an authorised AIF, or b) is not authorised or registered in an EEA State, but has its registered office or head office in the United Kingdom”. 
Regulation 4, instead, provides the definition of AIFM, as “a legal person, the regular business of which is managing one or more AIFs”. The AIFM of an AIF, according to the same article, “may be either: (1) another person appointed by or on behalf of the AIF and which through that appointment is responsible for managing the AIF (“external AIFM”); or, (2) where the legal form of the AIF permits internal management and where the AIF’s governing body chooses not to appoint an external AIFM, the AIF itself (“internal AIFM”)”​[64]​.
		The same article, additionally, describes the activity of managing AIFs as performing at least risk management or portfolio management for the AIF, whilst, on the marketing of units or shares of AIFs, regulation 45 states that “an AIFM markets an AIF when the AIFM makes a direct or indirect offering or placement of units or shares of an AIF managed by it to or with an investor domiciled or with a registered office in an EEA State, or when another person makes such an offering or placement at the initiative of, or on behalf of, the AIFM”​[65]​.

3.1. The direct impact of the Regulations 2013 on the AIFMs
	
The impact of the new UK legislation on the managers of AIFs is relevant, given that, before the transposition of the AIFMD, according to FSMA 2000 and RAO 2001, the managers of alternative investment funds established as Unregulated Collective Investment Schemes (UCISs)​[66]​ had to be authorised by the Financial Services Authority (FSA)​[67]​ (now Financial Conduct Authority or FCA​[68]​) for carrying on some of the following specified activities, depending on the business model: dealing as principal, arranging deals in investments, management functions, investment advice​[69]​. 
Now, due to the transposition of the AIFMD, instead, the activity of “managing an AIF” in the UK is treated as a regulated activity under the FSMA 2000 and the RAO 2001 at the same way as the activity of “mananging a UCITS”​[70]​. This is the  interpretation resulting by the rules of FSMA 2000 and RAO 2001. The FSMA 2000 provides the general prohibition under section 19 precluding anyone other than an authorised person or an exempt person from carrying on regulated activities. The RAO 2001, as amended by the Regulations 2013, now also gives the definition of “managing an AIF”​[71]​ besides the definition of “managing a UCITS”. 
The consequent legal effect is that the persons who want to carry on said activity need to be authorised by the FCA for “managing an AIF”.
The granting of this authorisation is regulated by FSMA 2000 with the general provisions of the part 4.A. (Permission to Carry on Regulated Activities), by RAO 2001 in the section 51ZC and by the Regulations 2013 in article 5 that lists the requisits that the applicant has to meet in order to obtain the permission by the FCA to manage AIFs​[72]​ and summarises the information that it has to provide to the Authority​[73]​.
Looking at the UK industry it seems possible to argue that the new regulatory framework represents a significant change, given that now UK managers in charge of managing and marketing AIFs need to be authorised as AIFMs for “managing an AIF” by the FCA​[74]​. For this reason, many managers, who before the transposition of the AIFMD were authorised for managing investment, had to apply in order to be re-authorised for “managing an AIF”​[75]​.
It also seems that very important aspects of the Regulations 2013 are the ones concerning the depositary and the external valuer. They are very innovative provisions since, before implementing the AIFMD, the UK system had nothing similar regarding the alternative investment funds established as UCISs​[76]​. In fact, in the past, the managers were authorised mostly for management functions or investment advice services, so it was not necessary to appoint an independent depositary for the custody of the fund’s assets and an external valuer for calculating the net asset value of the fund​[77]​.

3.2. The indirect impact of the Regulations 2013 on the AIFs

	One of the most important categories of AIFs in the UK system is represented by the so-called UCISs. These schemes are particularly important because they are usually used by hedge fund managers in order to establish their investment vehicles as well as by the managers of other sophisticated and complex schemes such as private equity or venture capital​[78]​.
They heve been defined by the FCA as collective investement schemes “in relation to which the operator has not applied for or obtained FCA authorised or recognised scheme status. They are not generally subject to FCA or similar overseas rules on the operation of collective investment schemes. UCIS may not be promoted to the general public (including through advise sales). Authorised persons may only promote UCIS to an investor who falls within one of the categories in COBS 4.12​[79]​ or an exemption in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Promotion of Collective Investment Schemes) Exemptions Order 2001 (PCIS Order)”​[80]​.   
It follows that they are neither subject to the release of an authorisation order by the FCA nor to the limits of investment and borrowing laid down in the FCA Handbook COLL in relation to the other schemes​[81]​.
The regulatory effect coming from the fact that these schemes are more free than the others in choosing the investment policies to perform is that they cannot be offered to the general public, namely to all the types of investors, including ordinary retail investors​[82]​. 
In fact, the investors who can invest in UCISs are: (1) retail clients who are sophisticated investors, both certified sophisticated investors and self-certified sophisticated investors, but in this second case only if the firm making the promotion considers that the product is likely to be suitable for that client following a preliminary assessment of the client’s profile and objectives​[83]​; (2) retail clients who are high net worth investors, but only if the firm making the promotion considers that the product is likely to be suitable for that client following a preliminary assessment of the client’s profile and objectives,)​[84]​; (3) professional clients; and, 4) eligible counterparties. 
Hence ordinary retail investors cannot invest in these particular AIFs, as these financial products are deemed too risky and complex and therefore inappropriate for them​[85]​.
Even if UCISs can continue to be unauthorised and free to use any investment strategy, it is now necessary that their managers have a special authorisation, that the custody of their assets is entrusted to an independent guardian and that the task of calculating the value of their assets is delegated to an independent-external valuer.
This means that the new rules arising from the transposition of the AIFMD also have an indirect impact on these funds. 

4. Has the UK system maintained its attractiveness after the implementation of the AIFMD? 

	By analysing the UK regulation, it seems possible to argue that the Legislature and the FCA succeeded in finding a compromise between the typically anglo-saxon business-friendly approach and the prescriptive approach of the EU. Therefore, it should be able to continue attracting investors and financial players.
	This compromise can be found particularly in the possibility of establishing UCISs.
	 In fact, the freedom of investment and in borrowing that UCISs can enjoy is a very important aspect of the UK framework given that it represents the real reason why many funds are established under this type or form. In other words, given that fund managers often prefer to freely manage their schemes utilising every kind of sophisticated and risky management techniques that they deem convenient; they usually utilise the only suitable UK vehicles to do so, i.e. UCISs.
From a business perspective, the potential advantage that can be gained by establishing UK UCISs is the fact that, on one side, they are unregulated, and on the other, they are now considered EU AIFs and for this reason they can benefit from the EU passport​[86]​.




Even if the UK Government was diametrically opposed to the adoption of the AIFMD, in the end, it seems that its transposition has been done in a balanced and intelligent way. For this reason it is possible to forecast that the domestic system, still having several interesting regulatory elements, will be able to continue attracting investors and financial players from other jurisdictions (both EU and non-EU), as has always happened over the history of the UK as a financial centre.  
The data concerning the activities of non-EU AIFMs and non-EU AIFs in the Union, published by ESMA, confirms that the UK system is the favoured gateway for non-EU entities to access the EU market​[88]​ and that many UK AIFMs have already started using extensively the EU AIFMD passport​[89]​.
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